Burden of Proof for Willfulness in FBAR Violations (9/6/11)

A key issue in considering the FBAR willfulness penalty is the standard standard of proof if the Government pursues the FBAR penalty. The Government is required to pursue the FBAR penalty by filing a suit and, if successful, obtaining judgment, rather than through the panoply of collection devices for tax assessments.

In United States v. Williams, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90794 (E.D. Va. 2010), previously discussed here, the court said that it was applying a preponderance of the evidence standard but it is clear that it held the Government to a fairly strict standard of proof. For burden of proof afficionados, I should state that historically in Anglo-American jurisprudence, a party alleging fraud must prove the fraud at a higher level than preponderance of the evidence. See generally Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (applying, however, preponderance of evidence for fraud exception to bankruptcy discharge because of the nature and context of that exception). For example, if the IRS asserts the civil fraud penalty under § 6663, the Code only says that the burden of proof is on the IRS (§ 7454(a)) but the Code is silent as to whether the burden is preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing. But the law is clear that the IRS must prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence. See T.C. Rule 142(b); John Gamino, Tax Controversy Overburdened: A Critique of Heightened Standards of Proof, 59 Tax Law. 497, ___ n. 38 (2006) (“Tax Court Rule 142(b) echoes the statutory language but specifies the clear and convincing standard by which the government must carry its burden. While not technically controlling in other courts, Rule 142(b) is representative of the broadly prevailing rule.”). The clear and convincing burden is conceptualized as heavier than preponderance (the normal civil burden) and lighter than beyond a reasonable doubt (the criminal burden).
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