More on 18 USC § 2(b) Liability from the Larson / Pfaff / Ruble Case

In yesterday's blog titled "The Conduct Too Remote Is Not Evasion Argument in the Larson & Pfaff Petition for Certiorari," I discussed the application of 18 USC § 2(b) to make an actor guilty as a principal of a crime committed by another who may be entirely innocent in contrast to 18 USC § 2(a) which requires another criminal actor who the defendant aids and abets. The relevant portion of the § 2(b) is:

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

In the indictment, the Government relied upon both direct liability for their conduct under 7201 and upon 18 USC § 2. The instructions make clear that the Government was relying upon 2(b) (although it also relied on 2(a) as I shall note in a later blog). I provide the instructions below and, after doing that, will provide some further discussion of 2(b) liability from a case differentiating the 2(a) and 2(b) concepts.
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